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Semantic Normativity, Deference and Reference
Diego Marconi

Paolo Casalegno wrote three times about my book Lexical Competence (=LC). The first time, he wrote a review of the book for dialectica (Casalegno 1999). It was a very generous review: though he clearly saw many of the book's difficulties and confusions he chose not to insist on them. However, even in such a friendly review he pointed out two connected points of disagreement: he said he did not share (what he took to be) my scepticism about the notion of reference (p.158), and he insisted that, contrary to what I claimed in the book, a plausible account of the phenomenon of semantic deference required an objectivist notion of reference (p. 159). Thus, from beginning to premature end our discussion was concerned with the two notions of semantic normativity and reference, and how they are related to each other.

1. Casalegno’s first argument: deference presupposes the objectivity of reference. Just in order to set the scene, let me remind the reader of what is usually meant by "semantic deference". It is commonly acknowledged that at least as far as certain words are concerned, ordinary speakers “defer” to experts as to their proper use. The phenomenon of deference particularly concerns so called “technical” terms –words belonging to the special lexicon of some art or science- that happen to be used by common speakers as well: e.g. 'influenza', 'acid', or 'insect' ('gold', 'elm', and many other words have also been mentioned as having deferential uses). Minimally, semantic deference can be characterized as follows:
1. Ordinary, non-expert speakers know that word W has an expert usage that may differ from their own;
2. They believe that such expert use is the correct one;
3. They assume that their own use of W is consistent with the expert’s,
4. However, they are prepared to amend it if it is shown to be inconsistent with the expert’s
use.
When all of 1-4 hold, we say that word W is used deferentially by ordinary speakers. In Lexical Competence, I claimed that deference is just an aspect of a more general and pervasive phenomenon, semantic normativity (LC p.90): deference shows that we acknowledge that certain speakers are more competent than we are concerning, say, the word 'gold', so that it is reasonable for us to submit to their authority as far as using 'gold' is concerned; it doesn't necessarily show that what really matters for the use of 'gold' is the substance's "deep" nature, that experts, but not ordinary speakers are supposed to know. 
In the last sentence of his review Casalegno said that while he disagreed with my view of deference, he believed that the burden of proof laid on him. He took up that burden in an article he wrote three years later (Casalegno 2000). There he set up to show that a plausible account of semantic deference requires exactly the notion of reference that I rejected, i.e. "the view that words have the reference they have independently of whatever knowledge or ability is available to or within the linguistic community as a whole" (LC p.86). In the book, I had argued that reference, so understood, was irrelevant to both cognition and communication and had no role to play in the use of language, except the determination of the "objective" truth conditions of sentences, which, however, might forever elude the whole community of speakers (LC  p.105).
Casalegno's argument for the connection between deference and objective reference was the following. Suppose that, as I claimed in LC, the norm for the use of (say) 'gold' could not be something like "Apply 'gold' to whatever has the same nature as these samples". The alternative that I seemed to have in mind was something like "Model your use of 'gold' upon the use of speakers that are more competent than you are". But the very idea of a hierarchy of competences presupposes an objective notion of reference. One can even regard the entailment as a truism, Casalegno said: to say that someone is more competent than me in the use of word W is to say that "he is more successful than me in applying W", i.e. that he is better than me in applying W to whatever W refers to (2000, p.347).
Could there be other intepretations of "more competent than"? Casalegno envisaged three alternatives, two of which he quickly (and rightly) dismissed. First of all, "being more competent" cannot be seen as a purely sociological notion. A speaker S is not better at applying the word "amethyst" by being a geology professor at Harvard, hence a recognized expert; rather, she is recognized as an expert because she is better at applying "amethyst", among other words. Secondly, surely "more competent" cannot be taken to mean "more self-assured in the application of -say- 'amethyst'": a madman who is fully persuaded that he can smell diamonds is not made an expert by his utterly ungrounded self-assurance. Casalegno also envisaged and dismissed a third alternative; but there I found reason to disagree with him. He claimed that being referentially more competent about "amethyst" does not amount to being capable of invoking better reasons to justify one's application of "amethyst". First of all, such a characterization is inadequate for there are speakers who are entirely reliable in their application of some word W, though they are incapable of justifying their application. Subordinately, what could "better reasons" mean in this context? That A's reasons are better than B's reasons can only mean that A is more likely than B to apply W to whatever W refers to. So, again, the notion of "better reasons" presupposes an objective notion of
competence.​[1]​
In my reply (Marconi 2000), I objected to Casalegno's point about "naive" experts that though we do indeed happen to regard them as reliable, we do so only to the extent that we have reasons to believe that genuine experts would agree with them. Suppose a conflict between a mycologist (a certified mushroom expert) and Old Joe, the mountain man who "knows everything about mushrooms": a conflict about whether a given mushroom is or isn't a good boletus, Boletus edulis. Joe says it is, the professor says it isn't. My intuition is that we would go along with the mycologist, not with Old Joe. Why? One explanation is purely sociological, appealing to socially established mechanisms of authority (we are generally in awe of scientists). A better explanation, in my opinion, is that the mycologist can justify his application of 'boletus' whereas Joe cannot, and we have a tendency (itself justified) to privilege rational over non-rational authorities. Though Old Joe is a very competent speaker as far as mushrooms are concerned –e.g., his application of ‘boletus’ is correct most of the time- there are higher semantic authorities. It remains true, however  -and I conceded the point to Casalegno- that "referentially more competent in the use of W" cannot just mean "capable of providing better reasons for his use of W": plausibly, we would say that Old Joe is more competent than me in the use of 'boletus' (or whatever he calls those mushrooms) even though he cannot justify his use. However, the reason we would regard him as more competent ultimately rests upon the competence of other people that could provide such reasons. Unless we believe Old Joe to be guided by some sort of divinely inspired insight, we suppose he can tell boletus from other mushrooms because he unreflectively spots certain discriminating features, though he couldn't describe them and may even be unaware of some of them. A mycologist would know about such features, and may even be able to guess what Old Joe is doing.​[2]​
But anyway, Casalegno remarked, even if semantic authority is based on the ability to invoke better reasons, a speaker's reasons can only be better in the sense that the speaker is more likely to apply ‘boletus’ to whatever the word does apply to - to whatever it refers to (this was his second point). To this, I replied that I didn't see that at all as a natural paraphrase of "better reasons": properly to explicate "better reasons", a whole epistemology is required. I didn't mean to answer the question, "What makes one reason better than another?". I only meant to defer to the epistemologist for an answer. If the hierarchy of competences is not purely sociological then it is epistemic, and its nature depends on which epistemology is the correct one. 
One thing I did not say (but only hinted at) in my reply to Casalegno I now regard as perhaps more helpful. As we saw, he regarded it as a truism that if A is more competent than B in the use of W, then A is better than B in applying W to "whatever it refers to". I also tend to regard it as a truism, but that is because I see such a formulation as non-committal with respect to the issue: the issue can be seen as being about the interpretation of the phrase "what 'amethyist' refers to". So, I don't see Casalegno's triumphant conclusion, "A's superior competence about word W consists in his superior ability to apply W to whatever W refers to" as at all settling the issue. The issue can be rephrased as being about the interpretation of the phrase "whatever W refers to". 
There may have been a misunderstanding here: sometimes, Casalegno's discussion seems to presuppose that I wanted to put a ban on the word 'refer'. Though I have objections to the notion of objective reference, I have no such qualms with the word 'refer'. For example, I would not take issue with the view that superior competence consists in a better ability to apply the word to whatever the community takes it to refer to. Would such a characterization involve circularity? It may seem that it would, for on the one hand, we rely on experts to know what the communitarian standards of reference are (we take an expert to be a better interpreter than us of the communitarian standards); on the other hand, communitarian standards are fixed by the experts. So it seems that expert competence is defined on the basis of communitarian standard, but communitarian standard, in turn, is set by the experts, hence based on expert competence. Casalegno pointed out a similar circularity in the hypothesis that reference is fixed by the experts' knowledge and abilities, as being an expert is made to depend on the ability to apply a word to what it refers to (2000, p.348). The reason I don't think the above formulation is circular is this: the individual expert is indeed just an interpreter of the communitarian standard, while the experts collectively determine what the standard is. In fact, it would be more appropriate to say, not that experts fix the standard but that there is a continuing discussion among experts about what the standard is to be: about how such words as 'virus', or 'planet', or 'mammal' are to be used. Reaching a stable consensus may take years or even decades.​[3]​
But even so, isn't the discussion among experts about what the nature of the Ws is, or about whether some object x has, or does not have the same nature as most Ws? Sometimes;​[4]​ not necessarily, and, as a matter of fact, not always. Disagreement about whether 'planet' was to apply to Pluto had nothing to do with disagreement about Pluto's nature or the nature of other planets in the Solar System: astronomers did not disagree about such matters. When scientists discuss about whether a certain molecular structure is a virus they are not trying to determine whether it has the same molecular structure or the same kind of genomic structure as other viruses, as viruses differ from one another in these respects. What they look at is whether it is an infectious agent that can replicate only inside the living cells of an organism. Does this alone show that 'virus' is not a natural kind word? This would be reasoning in a circle: we take it as a fact of the use of language that the referential use of natural kind words is governed by identity of nature with paradigmatic examples, but then, if certain words that would naturally be regarded as natural kind words do not appear to be so governed, we just classify them out. 

2. Semantic norms based on objective reference would be inapplicable. A central objection I raised against the objectivist notion of reference was that semantic norms could not be based on such a notion. A norm such as "Apply 'gold' to whatever has the same nature as paradigmatic chunks of gold", or "Apply 'gold' to whatever has the same nature as these chunks of matter" is inapplicable in a community where nobody knows what it is for something to have the same nature as these things, so that nobody can check whether the norm applies (LC p. 100). What I had in mind was of course the Earthian community before the birth of chemistry: at that time and place, nobody was in a position to check whether a given liquid sample had the same nature as the stuff in rivers and lakes; indeed, nobody had any idea of that nature being what we take it to be, i.e. (supposedly) H2O. This objection was rejected both by Casalegno and by Tim Williamson in his discussion of LC (Williamson 1998). I will now try to answer some of their counterobjections. 
Both Casalegno and Williamson granted that norms in general, and semantic norms in particular, should be applicable. But they claimed that "deep" norms like those of above can indeed be applied. Casalegno pointed out that for a norm to be applicable it is only required that "a subject may reasonably believe that the application conditions hold", while it is not required that application conditions "can finally and beyond any doubt be determined to hold" (2000, p.349). Williamson added that a norm may be applicable by being associated with a defeasible technique, such as "Call 'water' whatever appears to have the same nature as the liquid over there".​[5]​ He went on to point out that if "fool's water" -stuff that looks like water, but does not really have the same nature as water- is not common in the community's environment, the community will be adequately served by its defeasible technique (1998, p.399). In other words, they will end up using 'water' for genuine water in most cases.
Now, starting with Casalegno's remark, I certainly agree that a norm's applicability does not hinge on its being possible to determine, beyond any doubt and in each single case, that the norm's application conditions hold. It is enough if in most cases we have good reasons to believe that they hold, or that they do not hold. I emphasize the qualification "in most cases": if there were only a handful of cases in which we have reason to believe that the conditions hold (or do not hold), the norm's applicability would be in doubt. For example, imagine the following: a vast and dangerous conspiracy, called the P29, has been taking shape in recent years. P29 members, who are committed to the ruin of democracy and the constitutional order, have inflitrated the highest echelons of government, the judiciary, the military, etc. Obviously, it would be disastrous if any member of P29 were admitted to restricted meetings dealing with national security: the norm suggests itself, “Never admit a P29 member to a national security meeting”. Unfortunately, there is absolutely no way to identify P29 members unless they do so themselves. However, some of them –a tiny  minority- believe in martyrdom: as they are aware that they will be shot on the spot if identified, they go to meetings and reveal their allegiance so they can die for their misguided cause. Even so, the norm “Never admit a P29 member to a national security meeting” would be regarded as essentially inapplicable, though there are a few cases in which it clearly applies.
However, this is not the main point. The main point is connected with the adverb 'reasonably'. For example, is it reasonable for pre-chemistry Earthians to believe that stuff that shares macroscopic properties of the liquid in lakes and rivers also shares its "deep" nature? What reasons could they produce? Once we know about the nature of water, we may also know what the symptoms of such nature are: i.e., what are the common macroscopic properties of stuff that is H2O (we know that though they are not always reliable as indicators of water, most of the time they are). If on the other hand we don't know what the nature of water is, we can only conjecture that stuff that looks the same is likely to have the same nature, whatever that is: not because we know what it is to appear to have the same nature as that stuff, but because we apply a very general metaphysical principle, on which same macroscopic properties correspond to same (hidden) nature. Is this a reasonable principle? Not unqualifiedly, as we shall see in a moment.
Similar considerations apply to Williamson's "rule of thumb", "Call 'water' whatever appears to have the same nature as the liquid over there". Does the Earthian community know what it is to appear to have the same nature as that liquid? What they can be taken to know is that this sample shares certain properties with that liquid: whether that counts as knowing that it appears to have the same nature as that liquid is a separate issue. Does a cherry appear to have the same nature as a strawberry tree fruit because they are both red, round and smallish? No. Notice that the point is not that they appear to have the same nature but don't; the point is that they don't even appear to have the same nature. Why not? Because the properties they share don't count: in this case, they are not the kind of properties that manifest deep nature. So, one must know something (in fact, quite a bit) about something's nature and its relation to macroscopic properties to reasonably take the fact that x shares properties P1,..., Pn with y as x's appearing to have the same nature as y. But pre-chemistry Earthians knew close to nothing about the nature of water (at least if the nature of water is identified as H2O), or about its relation to familiar properties of water. Hence, they could not reasonably  apply Williamson's rule of thumb. Of course I agree that they ended up applying 'water' to genuine water most of the time: not because they applied Williamson's rule of thumb, however, but because the properties they went by were indeed reliable symptoms of water.
This doesn't show that Earthians couldn't have believed they were applying Williamson's rule: only that it wouldn't have been reasonable for them to believe as much, for they had no strong reason to believe that the properties they were going by were reliable indicators of a common deep nature. This is relevant to another objection of Williamson's. He remarks that, clearly, even if we did not go by the "deep nature" norm, we could: our use of 'elm' or 'water' could be governed by such a norm. But if I [DM] were right, no word could be governed by such a norm. So, I must be wrong (1998, p.399). Now, of course I am not claiming that we could not go by the deep nature norm under any circumstances: once we have a scientific notion of "deep nature" for substances (such as the notion of chemical composition) and we have identified it in many cases -such as the case of water- we certainly can, and in a sense actually do go by such a norm ("the community" does). What I am claiming is that it is hard to see how we could go by such a norm as long as we have no idea of what the deep nature of a substance might be, and have only the metaphysical notion of deep nature to rely upon.
Though people hypothesized that natural objects have deep natures for a long time before modern notions of such natures arose, they did not necessarily believe that the use of language was governed by them. For example, John Locke believed that the superficial properties of things might be consequences of their hidden nature (that he tended to see as corpuscular structure). But he famously insisted that such a "real essence" had no role to play in the workings of language:
"The next thing to be considered is by which of those essences [nominal and real] it is that substances are  determined into sorts or species; and that, it is evident, is by the nominal essence. For it is that alone that the  name, which is the mark of the sort, signifies. [...] Why do we say, this is a horse and that a mule, this is an animal, that an herb? How comes any particular thing to be of this or that sort but because it has that nominal essence or, which is all one, agrees to that abstract idea that name is annexed to?" (Essay, III, VI, 7).

The belief that things have, or might have a deep nature from which their macroscopic properties flow does not necessarily go together with a belief that words such as 'horse' or 'herb' are used on that basis, i.e. that we categorize things by conjecturing identity of real essence on the basis of identity of macroscopic properties (what Locke called 'nominal essence').​[6]​ 
Other people disagreed with Locke. I am not claiming that an objectively based semantic norm would be inapplicable in the  sense that people could not have taken themselves (contra Locke) to be relying on such a norm, perhaps through the intermediary of something like Williamson's rule of thumb; what I am claiming is that (1) it would not have been reasonable for them to describe themselves as going by such a norm, and (2) they would not in fact have been going by such a norm: to identify water, they were simply relying on certain macroscopic properties.

3. Casalegno's "right move": reference is what determines truth conditions. Casalegno took up these issues again in a paper he wrote a few years later (Casalegno 2007). He started by pointing out
that a premise of the 2000 discussion had been the existence of a general semantic norm: "The forms of behaviour one hints at when one speaks of semantic deference should be accounted for by the speakers' intention to conform to a single general norm" (p.202), namely something like "Model your use of word W upon the use of speakers that are more competent than you are". But this, he pointed out, is a mistake: it is unlikely that there is such a general norm, and anyway, that is not what I [DM] had in mind. Saying that speakers conform to the experts' use is just a synthetic summary of a variety of facts, not the expression of a general norm. He proposed an analogy: suppose that every time a group of boy scouts are planning to go out for a hike, someone is chosen within the group (call him “the leader”) that everybody else in the group must follow. We can describe such an arrangement by saying that "during hikes, boy scouts must follow their leader". However, this does not mean that the scouts' behaviour in hikes can be explained by assuming that they have been told, once for all, to follow their leader: obviously they have to be told, in each single case, who is the person they are supposed to follow. Similarly, Casalegno said, for some words the community relies on the judgement of some of its members, for other words it relies on other members; there is no reason to postulate a single norm that would be responsible for semantic deference as such.
It is not entirely clear to me what difference this recantation makes for the discussion of 2000. Let's forget for a moment about the alleged general norm: suppose we are just talking about the norm for 'gold'. And suppose that the norm is "Conform your use of 'gold' to the use of people that are more competent than you are in the use of 'gold'". Surely, for this norm to be applicable it must be made clear who these competent people (the experts) are: the scouts couldn't follow the leader if they didn't know who the leader was. Now, it seems to me that the 2000 controversy revolved around the issue of what characterizes a speaker as an expert in the use of 'gold': Casalegno claimed that an expert in the use of 'gold' is a speaker who is more likely to apply 'gold' to whatever 'gold' really refers to, whereas I claimed that an expert is a speaker who can provide better reasons to justify his use of 'gold'. It seems to me that this dialectic is independent of whether
we are talking of a particular norm or of semantic norms in general.
But perhaps I am misunderstanding. Perhaps Casalegno's point could be put by saying that, in my view, there needn't be a general notion of an expert. Experts are simply the people that the community recognizes as such in each single case, for a variety of reasons. Being an expert of X, in
the view that Casalegno attributed to me in 2007, is simply being recognized as such by the community - something less than the sociological view. As Casalegno remarked, this does not necessarily entail that experts are regarded as oracles, whose decisions are obeyed no matter how arbitrary and whimsical they are (p.203): reasons and arguments do have a place in the dynamics of
semantic deference. But, ultimately, the brute fact of communitarian recognition prevails. 
Casalegno said that he was not persuaded by this conception of experts (and, consequently, of semantic deference) (2007, p.205). Neither am I; indeed, I believe that Casalegno's discussion of the role of reasons and arguments in the expert's dealings with the linguistic community shows that experts are not constituted as such by brute social recognition. If they were, then the people that the
general public and the media regard as experts would invariably be experts; but we know that this is
sadly not the case. To repeat, experts are constituted as such by the kind of reasons and arguments they can bring to bear on disputes in their area of competence. Usually, the soundness of such reasons and arguments can only be assessed by other experts: this explains why the layperson cannot but take the sociological shortcut and rely on institutional recognition to identify experts. But recognition does not create expertise: when all goes well, it sanctions it. Expertise itself –the  ability to introduce the right kind of reasons and arguments- is formed by training (of different sorts in different areas: the training of an expert of musical instruments is not the same as a physicist’s) and ultimately guaranteed by the considered judgment of other experts. The title of expert is awarded by a debating community, not by reality itself.
Anyway, in the 2007 paper Casalegno stopped challenging what he took to be my conception of semantic norms and the role of experts, for he thought he had found a better line of argument. The right move, he said, is a different one. 
My main objection to the objective notion of reference, he pointed out, was that semantic norms based on such a notion would be inapplicable. However, the notion of reference is not easily interpretable as a normative notion: it has its proper place "within a semantics on which a sentence's meaning is constituted by its truth conditions" (2007, p.207). A word's reference is "that by virtue of
which the word contributes to determine the truth or falsity of the sentences in which it occurs". The
alleged facts that are supposed to show that friends of objective reference are proposing inapplicable norms "are simply cases in which the truth values of certain sentences [such as 'This is water'] are unknown. It is usually taken for granted that there are sentences that have a determinate truth value even though nobody knows what it is". "This -he concluded- is enough to dissolve scruples about allegedly inapplicable norms".
Let me redescribe Casalegno's "right move" as follows. What are the facts that are supposed to motivate all the fuss about inapplicable norms? For example, the fact that according to the proposed specification of the reference of 'water', before 1750 nobody on Earth could determine whether a given sample of liquid was water, as nobody on Earth could determine whether that sample had the same deep nature of some paradigmatic sample; and that was because nobody had any idea of what the deep nature of either sample was. Well, Casalegno says, so what? This amounts to saying that there were sentences -'water' sentences- whose truth value was unknown. It is generally admitted that this does not entail that their truth value was not determined: indeed, given what we know nowadays about water it is plausible to think that most pre-1750 utterances of "This is water" were true. Even less​[7]​ does it entail that the reference of the constituents of 'water'- sentences was not determined. So, the facts that are invoked against the "objective" notion of reference do not show that in the case of 'water' reference, so understood, fails to do its proper job, i.e. contributing to the truth value of the sentences in which it occurs.
Let me first point out that in LC I explicitly granted (p.105) that there was nothing wrong with the "objective" notion of reference as far as determination of the truth conditions of sentences was concerned. The problems I saw concerned the role of the notion in accounting for cognition, communication, and the application of words. In spite of that, I was always slightly uneasy, and I still am, with the idea that before 1750 people didn't know that the stuff they drank every day was water (though they believed that it was, truly in most cases). Could one accept objective reference determination while rejecting this conclusion? One could argue, e.g., that pre-1750 people possessed perfectly good justifications for their belief that it was water they used to drink, even though their justifications were not based on knowledge of the composition of water (in fact, they didn't believe that water had a composition). But then, if they knew that that was water then, it, seems, they also knew the reference of 'water', i.e. -on the proposed account- they knew that that had the same deep nature as paradigmatic samples. And such knowledge we hesitate to attribute to them, for it seems to require that they knew the nature of water. But they didn't: otherwise, we wouldn't say that the "deep nature" of water, i.e. its being H2O, was discovered by Lavoisier (or perhaps by Watt).​[8]​ So, it seems that on the proposed, objectivist account of reference we must rest content with saying that they believed (truly, in most cases) but didn't really know that it was water they were drinking.
Coming back to Casalegno's "right move", he seems to think that once it is established that an "objective" view of reference does no harm to the truth conditions of sentences, it follows that it does no harm anywhere. For example, the alleged inapplicability of objectively based norms reduces to the well known fact that a sentence may have a determinate truth value even though that value is unknown within the community that uses that sentence. However, I believe that the difficulty I raised cannot be solved simply by being reminded of the distinction between metaphysics and epistemology, because the difficulty is epistemological, not metaphysical. The inapplicability of objectively based norms does not derive from their lack of content or from any indeterminacy in the truth conditions of certain sentences. A norm may have perfectly determinate content and be inapplicable nevertheless. 
Suppose we make a law whose application depends on Goldbach's conjecture G in the following way: if G is true, then the law applies to all and only males; if G is false, it applies to females. Suppose it is a very simple law, e.g. (x)(x must serve in the army for one year at age 18). The law's content, I take it, is fairly clear. Its conditions of applications are also clear, to the extent that the notions of "male" and "female" are not regarded as particulary vague: if G is true, males that are 18 year old must serve for one year; if G is false, females must. If we are mathematical objectivists and believe that G is either true or false in any case, no indeterminacy of any kind is involved. No more than would be involved in a law that applied to males if the ratio of the euro to the dollar on January 1st, 2013 is 1.40 or higher, and to females otherwise - indeed, less so (our present currencies might disappear before Jan. 1st). Still, it would be crazy to make such a law about serving in the military. Why? Because it would not be applicable: as we don't know whether G is true or false, we don't know whether we should apply the law to males or to females. Could we
say: "Well, though we don't know whether G is true, most of us feel that it has to be true: lots and lots of even numbers greater than 2 are sums of two primes, and we found none that are not; so let's apply the law to males"? Peace-loving males would probably be outraged by such a decision, and rightly so: feeling that a proposition is true is not regarded as decisive evidence of its actual truth, particularly in mathematics. So, a law may have fully determinate content yet be inapplicable for epistemic reasons. I take it that this is the case with objectively based semantic norms, for the reasons I tried to explain a moment ago.
However, a problem remains not with semantic deference in general, but with what might be
called 'deference to future generations'. Suppose the norm for 'water' is an objectively based norm, such as "Apply 'water' to whatever has the same nature as those samples". People's application of the norm is based on macroscopic properties, allegedly on the hypothesis that they manifest hidden nature. Then at some point chemistry is born, and the hidden nature of water is revealed. Contextually, tests are created to determine whether something has such a deep nature - whether it is H2O, say. By such tests, it is established that though most liquids that people called 'water' were indeed H2O, some were not. It is claimed that, in such circumstances, people would not say "Well, they were water in the previous sense of 'water'; now we found reasons to use 'water' differently, so
we won't call those liquids 'water' any longer". No: it is claimed that people would rather say "So, in
spite of appearances, those samples were not water: all along we were wrong in calling them 'water'". This, it is claimed, shows that they were really applying the objectively based norm. For by saying they had been wrong, they recognize that they were taking whatever criteria they were using as reliable symptoms of some hidden nature. 
I don't know what such people would say, or what real people did say in comparable historical cases. It is not easy to learn lessons from historical cases, because changes in the conception of a substance are usually not sudden: they take time and go through intermediate stages, so it is hard to check "what people said when it was discovered that p". I agree with the standard view that the second statement ("We had been wrong") is at least as plausible as the first ("It was water in the old sense") as something that people would say in such circumstances. Notice, however, that that doesn't show that they were going by the objectively based norm: it only shows that they believed they were. If they believed they were relying on macroscopic properties as symptoms of some hidden nature (for commonality of nature was the real rationale of their use of 'water'), they would now draw the conclusion that such symptoms were not entirely reliable and they had been wrong to regard them as such. As I said, they had no reason to regard macroscopic properties as reliable symptoms of a hidden nature about which they knew nothing; they couldn't reasonably take them as such. But, of course, they may have been unreasonable. 
But then, if they believed (reasonably or not) that they went by the "deep nature" norm, didn't they actually go by the norm? Could one believe to be guided by a norm N while really being guided by M, or by no norm at all? It seems so. Suppose I believe that 'water' applies to whatever has the same nature as what the Spirit of God moved upon on the First Day (Gen. I,2); moreover, I also believe that a reliable symptom of something's having the same nature as that liquid is its being transparent, thirst-quenching, etc. The norm I believe to be obeying is: "Apply 'water' to whatever has the same nature as the liquid upon which...". Now, suppose the Genesis story is false, or anyway not literally true: there never was any liquid upon which the Spirit of God moved, hence nothing has or ever had the same nature as that liquid. So my belief that being transparent, thirst-quenching etc. is a reliable symptom of having the same nature as that liquid is also false: though the liquid samples I call 'water' are indeed transparent etc., they do not have the same nature as the liquid the Spirit of God moved upon - nothing has. Hence, although I believe that my use of 'water' is governed by the Biblical norm, it doesn't count as being governed by that norm because the criteria I go by in my application of 'water' have no connection with the content of the norm I believe to be guided by, even though I believe them to have such a connection. So it seems that language users’ beliefs are not sufficient to determine which semantic norm they go by.
Paolo Casalegno concluded his paper of 2007 by restating a claim he had put forth before,​[9]​ namely that our use of language requires a certain kind of naive metasemantics: a conceptualization of language that includes a notion of reference having “pretty much the features attributed to it by the proponents of direct reference theory" (2007, p.210). Perhaps, he suggested, the externalist notion of reference will never develop into a theoretical notion to be used in a thoroughly scientific study of language; however, it will remain “a necessary requirement for the use of language”, not just part of an a posteriori rationalization of it. The use of language requires a naive (meta)semantics for the same reason that conscious interaction with our physical environment and with other human beings require both a naive physics and a naive psychology. It wouldn’t be so if language were a mechanism, i.e. if we mechanically reacted to our occurring circumstances by uttering sentences and mechanically recorded the information conveyed by other people’s utterances. However, “choosing what to say and interpreting what other people say to us are conscious processes, requiring reflection and deliberation, hence a conceptualization of the properties of language; more particularly, of how language encodes information about the world that is accessible to consciousness” (p.210). Such a conceptualization Casalegno regarded as part of  what he called “common sense” (indeed, of its “deep and persistent core”): a product of our biological constitution that is not, however, to be investigated with the tools of biological research. This is because investigation of naive semantics requires an (albeit limited) use of the very concepts and principles we are investigating: that we could dispense with them is an illusion, “as laughable as the attempt to make the content of naive psychology explicit without using such words as ‘belief’, ‘desire’, etc. as belonging to our [i.e. the investigator’s] lexicon” (p.211). Hence, the investigation of common sense will never become fully scientific: it will forever remain the province of philosophy.
Questions crowd. To mention just one: it appears that Casalegno’s naive semantics, possession of which is required by the use of language, should be distinguished from what we might
call “folk semantics”, the explicit theory (or family of theories) that most people entertain and that one could think of eliciting by interviewing them about the nature of language. The latter may well include, alongside some notion of reference, something very close to the notion of meaning that was
criticized by Kripke and Putnam, among others. Hence, the conceptualization that ordinary speakers
must possess to use language is not to be identified with their views on language: it is implicit conceptualization, that they may contradict when explicitly stating such views. In this respect, Casalegno’s naive semantics resembles naive physics more than naive psychology: most of us could not state, and may even fail to understand the principles of “physics” we turn out to be going by in our interactions with the physical environment (e.g. our “belief” that freely falling bodies have uniform motion and fall with a speed that is proportional to their weight). But then, naive physics is scientifically investigated, and the concepts and principles that are investigated are not –it seems to me- part of the investigators’ theoretical framework. If naive semantics, like naive physics, is part and parcel of our cognitive system, why should it be excluded from scientific investigation? If on the other hand it is more like a theoretical framework we consciously use when “choosing what to say and interpreting what other people say”, why is it so different from folk semantics?
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^1	  As we shall see, a few years later Casalegno came to believe that my account of deference did not really appeal, or anyway need not appeal to the kind of norm he is criticizing here (i.e. "For every word W, model your use of W upon the use of speakers that are more competent than you are concerning W"). But at that time, the discussion developed on the presupposition that it did.
^2	  The literature on “expert perceivers” (such as chicken sexers) is relevant here. See Pylyshyn 1999, p.359, and the sources he mentions.
^3	  In some cases, such as the recent (2006) redefinition of ‘planet’, dissenting opinions won’t go away: see e.g. http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2006/08/060824-pluto-planet.html.
^4	  When Okapis were discovered in 1900, they were regarded as akin to horses and consequently called ‘Equus johnstoni’; later, they were found to be evolutionarily related not to horses but to giraffes and renamed ‘Okapia johnstoni’ (see Marconi 2009, with references). The final test was provided by DNA analysis. The story can be read as being about the reference of ‘Equus’: whether Okapis were to be included in the reference of ‘Equus’ was ultimately decided on the basis of the similarity of their nature with the nature of other members of the Equus genus.
^5	  I am slightly adapting Williamson’s original example.
^6	  For a recent discussion see Galluzzo 2011, pp.165-170.
^7	  In principle, a sentence's truth value could be undetermined for syntactic reasons, even if the constituents' reference is fully determined.
^8	  "Lavoisier’s (or Watt’s) discovery of the composition of water can thus be described as the discovery that water is H2O" (Needham 2002, p.211).
^9	  See Casalegno 1997,  pp.387-392.
